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GROUP LEGAL SERVICES FOR TRADE 
ASSOCIATIONS 
Richard D. Copaken* 
T HE ethical standards which have traditionally governed the legal profession recently have come into conflict with an expanding 
conception of free speech and association. In a 1963 landmark deci-
sion, National Association for the Advancement of Colored Peo-
ple v. Button,1 the Supreme Court held Virginia's champerty and 
maintenance laws unconstitutional under the first and fourteenth 
amendments insofar as they prevented the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) from soliciting per-
sons to serve as plaintiffs in desegregation litigation and from pro-
viding them with counsel in these cases. In announcing this dra-
matic new limitation on the regulation of the legal profession, the 
Court recognized that the private lawsuit may well be, in substance 
if not form, a vehicle for the achievement of group political ob-
jectives: 
In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of 
resolving plivate differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful 
objectives of equality of treatment by all government, federal, state 
and local, for the members of the Negro community in this country. 
It is thus a form of political expression.2 
The Court deliberately chose to read the first and fourteenth amend-
ments expansively to protect a broad class of orderly group activity, 
including "vigorous advocacy" as well as "abstract discussion."3 
In Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia (BRT),4 the 
Court extended the reasoning of Button to protect a plan by which 
• Member of the District of Columbia Bar. B.A. 1963, LL.B. 1966, Harvard Uni-
versity.-Ed. 
I. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
2, Id. at 429. Pound observed that the conflict between the "individualist spirit of 
the common law" and the "collectivist tendencies of today" represents a cause of dis-
satisfaction which is peculiar to our Anglo-American legal system. R. PouND, THE 
LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES xxiv (1953). Perhaps the Court's candid 
recognition in Button of the primarily group-serving function of NAACP-sponsored 
private lawsuits is a healthy step in the direction of eliminating this cause of dissatis-
faction. Professor Henry M. Hart suggested in a lecture to his Harvard Law School 
class on federal courts and the federal system that the reapportionment decisions 
represent, for better or for worse, a substantial shift in the law of standing-where it 
once was required that plaintiffs have a personal interest to invoke the power of the 
court, the voluntary representation of political group interests is now deemed adequate. 
Lecture Notes, Nov. 5-12, 1965. 
3. 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963). 
4. 377 U.S. I (1964). 
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the Brotherhood, a labor union, recommended to members injured 
in railway accidents particular attorneys who specialized in Federal 
Employers' Liability Act (FELA) cases. Thus, associational rights 
deriving from pocketbook interests were afforded the same protec-
tion as associational rights to achieve political objectives. 
In 1967, the Court had an opportunity to reassess this exten-
sion of the constitutionally protected right of association. Mine 
Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n (UMW)5 confronted the Court with 
the same issue which it had faced in BRT, albeit stripped of any 
peculiarly federal legislative interest. Whereas the BR T channeled 
individual members' FELA claims to selected attorneys, the UMW 
employed a salaried attorney to represent individual members' 
workmen's compensation claims before the state Industrial Com-
mission. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the UMW had 
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, distinguishing BRT 
on the ground that the mere channeling of legal work to selected 
attorneys was less destructive of the traditional attorney-client re-
lationship than the direct financial arrangement employed by the 
UMW. Button, where attorneys were paid directly by the NAACP, 
was distinguished on the ground that the associational interests pro-
tected there were qualitatively different-a form of political expres-
sion more important than the bodily injury complaints of the mine-
workers. Moreover, the Illinois court noted that in Button there 
had been a dearth of local lawyers willing to handle civil rights 
litigation and that the state court decree overturned by the Supreme 
Court had proscribed not only the NAACP's direct salary arrange-
ment but also any arrangement by which prospective litigants were 
advised to seek the assistance of particular attorneys. 
The Supreme Court refused to accept these limiting distinc-
tions; instead, the Court asserted its intention to give the broadest 
possible constitutional sweep to its two prior decisions: 
We do not think our decisions in Trainmen and: Button can be 
narrowly limited. We hold that the freedom of speech, assembly, 
and petition guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
gives petitioner the right to hire attorneys on a salary basis to assist 
its members in the assertion of their legal rights. 
We think that both the Button and Trainmen cases are con-
trolling here. 6 
. . Th_e Court took_ cognizan_ce of the distinction between the "po-
5. 389 U.S. 217 (1967). 
6. 389 U.S. at 221-22, 223. 
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litical matters of acute social moment" at stake in Button and the 
economic interest asserted by the mineworkers, but it found this 
distinction identical to that which it had rejected in BRT as irrel-
evant under the first amendment. Moreover, the Court found it 
equally irrelevant under the first and fourteenth amendments that 
the litigation in BRT involved federal statutory rights, while the 
plan in UMW was utilized to further state-created rights: 
Our holding in Trainmen was based not on state interference with 
a federal program in violation of the Supremacy Clause but rather 
on petitioner's freedom of speech, petition, and assembly under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments, and this freedom is, of course, 
as extensive with respect to assembly and discussion related to 
matters of local as to matters of federal concem.7 
The Court in UMW conceded the broad power of the states to 
regulate the practice of law but concluded that this power is quali-
fied by the first amendment right of association; the dangers of 
"baseless litigation and conflicting interests" were "too speculative" 
to justify the broad remedy invoked by the state. Thus, where the 
Court views the dangers to the public as less speculative, relatively 
broad state proscriptions still might be valid. Indeed, even the 
dangers which the Court deemed speculative in UMW might jus-
tify more narrowly defined regulation which imposes less restraint 
on the right of association.8 
UMW is significant primarily because it provides an indication 
of the Court's willingness to follow the logic of Button and BRT 
wherever it reasonably may lead. 
One indisputable conclusion can be drawn from these three de-
cisions. Certain of the current Canons of Professional Ethics-par-
ticularly canon 47, prohibiting attorneys from aiding the unautho-
rized practice of law; canon 35, directed against the intervention 
of lay intermediaries between attorney and client; and canons 27 
and 28, proscribing solicitation and the stirring up of litigation by 
attorneys or their agents-must now be qualified by the first amend-
ment associational rights of the public. These canons are modeled 
7. 389 U.S. at 224 n.5. 
8. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion did not quarrel with the need for such a 
balancing of interests in resolving this first amendment question, but the Justice took 
issue with the way in which the majority struck the balance: 
Since the finding that the union plan presents dangers to the public and legal 
profession is not an arbitrary one, and since the limitation upon union members 
is so slight, in view of the permissible alternatives still open to them, I would 
hold that there has been no denial of constitutional rights occasioned by Illinois' 
prohibition of the plan. 
389 U.S. at 233, 
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on a traditional conception of the attorney-client relationship which 
may no longer be appropriate. 
Fundamental ethical principles have continuing validity; but, 
if the specific articulations of these principles in the Canons do not 
keep pace with the changing premises from which they are derived, 
they can cloud the profession's perception of those public needs which 
the profession is obligated to serve. It took the powerful current of 
the civil rights movement to correct the warp that had developed be-
tween the Canons, which are based upon an historical view of the 
public interest, and the actual changed character of that interest. 
Freed by Button, BRT, and UMW from an acceptance of the 
Canons as absolute, the courts and the profession can now respond 
to new pressures from many directions. The developing recogni-
tion of the need to provide adequate legal services to the indigent 
has challenged the legal profession to reshape its traditional con-
ceptions of the attorney-client relationship. The needs of union 
members had also long been unsatisfied by the legal profession act-
ing in its orthodox, highly individualized role. To the extent that 
such needs have been met, it has been by a form of group legal 
services the existence and possible harmful consequences of which 
the profession has either largely ignored, as in the case of legal aid 
to indigents, or uncritically decried as violative of the Canons, as 
in the case of services provided union members. A reawakening of 
the profession to the needs of the public, coupled with a recogni-
tion that new concepts of service may be necessary if these needs are 
to be met, can certainly be a healthy development. Nevertheless, 
it would be unfortunate if the profession, in its zeal for reform, 
should overlook the dangers at which the Canons were originally 
directed, which may continue to exist, or the values which the 
Canons sought to perpetuate, which may have continuing vitality. 
Bold experimentation is called for in this period, but perspective 
is equally necessary. 
In Button, BRT, and UMW the Court seems largely to have 
ignored or cavalierly discounted as too speculative the possibility 
of harm to the public which might be caused by violations of the 
traditional Canons. Perhaps this was due to the overwhelming im-
portance of specialized group legal services in these cases. One way 
to achieve perspective in delineating the proper scope of Button, 
BRT, and UMW is to analyze the impact of these cases where the 
justification for their extension is apparently the weakest. The legal 
representation of the affluent members of trade associations, or-
ganized primarily for economic purposes, presents one such con-
text in which the need for group legal services is not obvious. Fur-
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thermore, such representation constitutes a substantial portion of 
the practice of many major law firms today. Consequently, there is 
a significant need for useful guidelines here, where the applicability 
of Button, BRT and UMW is least clear. This Article will examine 
the goals of the Canons of Professional Ethics in this trade asso-
ciation context, noting the pre-Button limitations on the represen-
tation of members of such associations, and analyzing the possible 
impact of the three cases on the development of group legal serv-
ices in this area. Hopefully, the perspective gained from such an 
examination may prove useful in the difficult task immediately con-
fronting the legal profession: reformulation of the Canons to bring 
them into conformity with Button, BRT and U.MW while mini-
mizing, on the one hand, the loss of those traditional conceptions 
which have continuing value and validity, and maximizing, on the 
other, the utility of the Canons as general guidelines to ethical 
conduct. 
I. BEFORE BurroN: THE TRADITIONAL Vmw 
The attorney's role is circumscribed by duties and obligations 
emanating from four authorities: statutes, common-law decisions 
and the inherent power of the courts to regulate the practicing bar, 
the Canons, and the customs and practice of the bar.9 The focus 
here will be upon the regulatory purposes and effect of the Canons, 
which are given the force of statutory law in many jurisdictions,10 
and which "are commonly regarded by bench and bar alike as 
wholesome standards of professional ethics" even in those juris-
dictions where they have no statutory force.11 
Drinker attributes the development and adoption of Codes of 
Ethics in this country, beginning with the Alabama Code in 1887, 
to the concerned reaction of thoughtful leaders of the bar to the 
"growing commercialism all over the country."12 The competitive 
marketplace may produce the lowest price for the consuming pub-
lic, but in the context of legal services this benefit was felt to be 
outweighed by the accompanying reduction of ethical standards to 
the lowest common denominator. Trust is at the heart of the attor-
ney-client relationship, and it was felt that the public could not place 
its trust in a profession that was governed only by the law of com-
petition. 
9. See H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 22 (1953) [hereinafter DRINKER]. 
IO. See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. GEN. R. 5(c); cf. CAL. Bus. &: PROF. CODE §§ 6068(e), 6076, 
rules 5 &: 7 (West 1962). 
11. Herman v. Acheson, 108 F. Supp. '728, 726 (D.D.C. 1952). 
12, DRINKER 24-25 (1953). 
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Currently, the pendulum seems to be swinging back to the les-
sons of the competitive marketplace. The highest ethical standards 
cannot meet the needs of the public if deviation from laissez-faire 
competitive ideals also forces the price of adequate legal services to 
rise beyond the reach of large segments of the public. Much of the 
current controversy over group legal services can be viewed as an 
effort to strike some balance between the allocation of our legal re-
sources which the marketplace would dictate as most efficient and 
the ethical ideal of the highly personalized attorney-client rela-
tionship, accompanied by undivided loyalty, which the present 
Canons demand. 
Before this balance can be attained, we must pinpoint and assess 
the continuing value of the goals and restrictions imposed by the 
traditional Canons. An illustration may help to focus this analysis. 
When an individual member requests legal advice from his trade 
association, how far can the law firm representing the association go 
in helping to frame such advice? What kind of advice can be given 
before the association finds itself engaged in the unauthorized 
practice of law? Before the law firm finds itself guilty of aiding such 
unauthorized practice in violation of canon 47 or other canons? What 
kind of unsolicited advice can the trade association give to members 
and nonmembers, and to what extent can the law firm representing 
the association participate in the framing of such advice? 
A. Canon 47: Aiding the Unauthorized Practice of Law 
There are two major problems relating to the unauthorized 
practice of law which should be kept distinct for purposes of analysis. 
The trade association may give advice in such a way as to itself be 
guilty of unauthorized practice of law. In addition, attorneys who 
knowingly assist such conduct violate canon 47: 
No lawyer shall permit his professional services, or his name, to be 
used in aid of, or to make possible, the unauthorized practice of 
law by any lay agency, personal or corporate.13 
Generally, the courts of each jurisdiction, in the exercise of 
their inherent supervisory power over the legal profession, deter-
mine what constitutes the practice of law.14 However, definitions 
13. Id. at 325. This canon was adopted by the American Bar Association (ABA) on 
September 30, 1937. Id. 
14. The inherent power of the judiciary in this area may not be exclusive. Al-
though, as a matter of long-standing tradition, the judiciary has regulated the entire 
practice of law, the courts may accede to concurrent legislative regulation, particularly 
with regard to activities outside the courtroom, as a matter of law or comity. Sec 
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of the practice of law are often so general that they are of little value 
in determining, in difficult cases, what kind of advice will amount 
to the unauthorized practice of law when rendered by a trade asso-
ciation.15 It has been suggested that the absence of a more precise 
statutory or court-made definition is both intentional and neces-
sary because of the dynamically expanding nature of legal practice.16 
Perhaps the best way to define what kind of advice constitutes the 
practice of law is to look at the particular problem upon which 
advice is sought, and to determine how much legal training and 
skill is required to solve it.17 
Toward that end, one distinction commonly made is between 
specific advice, relating to an individual problem, and general ad-
vice, as is typically available in books and periodicals. Most cases 
which condemn the giving of specific advice as the unauthorized 
practice of law have involved other conduct of a legal nature as 
well, such as the preparation of legal documents.18 However, two 
fairly recent cases raise the narrower issue. Oregon State Bar v. John 
H. Miller & Co.19 was the first state supreme court opinion on the 
question of whether a corporation can engage in estate planning. 
The Oregon trial court had enjoined the defendant company from 
engaging in most of its estate planning activities, but permitted it 
to give advice concerning the tax consequences of life insurance. The 
Oregon Supreme Court forbade even the latter practice, because 
such advice necessarily contained substantial legal content. In 
Green v. Huntington National Bank,2° an Ohio intermediate ap-
pellate court held that a bank's estate planning service, and the ad-
vertising thereof, constituted the unauthorized practice of law be-
cause it involved providing "specific legal information in relation 
Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 312 P.2d 998 (1957); 
Cowem v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940); Comment, Control of the 
Unauthorized Practice of Law: Scope of Inherent Judidal Power, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 
162 (1960). 
15. See, e.g., State v. C. S. Dudley &: Co., 340 Mo. 852, 858-59, 102 S.W.2d 895, 898-99 
(1937). 
16. Murphy, Practicing Law in the District of Columbia, 26 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE 
NEWS 276 (1960). 
17, See, e.g., People v. Schafer, 404 Ill. 45, 53, 87 N.E.2d 773, 777 (1949); Oregon State 
Bar v. John H. Miller&: Co., 235 Ore. 341, 385 P.2d 181, 182 (1963). It should be noted 
that the absence of compensation will not be relevant to the danger to the public from 
acts of the unskilled. Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Washington Ass'n of Realtors, 41 
Wash. 2d 697, 699, 251 P.2d 619, 621 (1952). 
18. See, e.g., New York County Lawyers' Ass'n, 181 Misc. 632, 43 N.Y.S.2d 479 (Sup. 
Ct. 1943). 
19. 235 Ore. 341, 385 P .2d 181 (1963). 
20. 3 Ohio App. 2d 62, 209 N.E.2d 228 (Franklin County Ct. App. 1964), modified, 4 
Ohio St. 2d 78, 212 N.E.2d 585 (1965). 
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to specific facts."21 The bank's activities had been solely advisory, 
and throughout the bank's estate plan advice were numerous state-
ments suggesting that the customer consult his own attorney. Fur-
thermore, the court suggested in dictum that its decision would have 
been the same regardless of the quality of the services actually ren-
dered. On the other hand, it has been held that the dissemination 
of general legal information by lay agencies does not constitute the 
unauthorized practice of law, especially where coupled with advice 
to consult an attorney if a specific problem arises.22 
Even if we ignore the thorny problem of how accurately to dis-
tinguish between specific and general advice, we must still deter-
mine the interest which the distinction serves before we can ratio-
nally assess its validity. The need for such an analysis becomes 
evident as one considers that the imperatives of the first amend-
ment and restrictions upon the giving of legal advice come more 
clearly into conflict as the advice in question becomes more gen-
eral. It is possible that the distinction between general and specific 
advice is sustained by this consideration: the need for legal expertise 
increases as a function of the specificity of the advice given; con-
versely, as the advice becomes more general, and thus increasingly 
a product of those broad principles known and assented to by all, 
so will the need for legal expertise on the advisor's part be dimin-
ished. A related consideration is the increased likelihood that a 
client will rely upon specific advice geared to his particular situa-
tion rather than upon general textbook information. One should 
not, however, underestimate the foolhardy, do-it-yourself spirit of 
many members of the public. 
Unhappily, these considerations may not be the only forces 
behind canon 47. Although efforts to define the practice of law may 
be justified by the need to protect the public from the practice of 
law by unqualified persons, the parallel objective of maintaining a 
closed-guild monopoly on all the available legal business may also 
underlie the willingness of the American Bar Association (ABA) 
to proscribe the aiding of such unauthorized practice by its member-
ship. These two motives often reinforce one another because it is 
generally in the interest of both the public and the legal profession 
that advice on legal matters be given only by qualified attorneys 
acting individually. However, on occasion, the anticompetitive con-
21. Id. at 129, 209 N.E.2d 230. 
22. See, e.g., State Bar Ass'n of Connecticut v. Connecticut Bank 8: Trust Co., 145 
Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863 (1958); Cain v. Merchants Nat'l Bank 8: Trust Co., 66 N.D. 
746, 268 N.W. 719 (1936). 
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sequences of such a restriction are so substantial, and the danger 
that the advice will be incompetent is so negligible, that the public 
interest may part company with the vested interest of the profes-
sion.23 This was illustrated in Button where the Negro plaintiffs 
might have been deprived of any legal advice or representation if 
the prohibition against performance of such services by attorney 
agents of the NAACP had been permitted to stand. 
Several other arguments have been advanced to restrict effective 
group legal service programs. It is generally held that since a cor-
poration cannot practice law directly, it cannot do so indirectly by 
using lawyers as agents.24 One reason given for this view is that 
a corporation, being other than a natural person, cannot be as ef-
fectively controlled by the court as an actual attorney. However, if 
an association or corporation is required to act through attorney-
agents, it is submitted that the court's power to control such agents 
as officers of the court should be sufficient to protect the public 
against advice lacking in legal skill or knowledge. Another argu-
ment consists of the baldly asserted non sequitur that "[a ]s the law-
yer cannot share his professional responsibility with a layman or 
lay agency, he cannot properly share his professional emoluments 
with them."25 Of course the same nondelegable nature of the attor-
ney's responsibilities does not prevent him from properly sharing 
his professional emoluments with his landlord, secretary, and others 
who similarly aid him in his work, all without dilution of his re-
sponsibility. At any rate, before Button a trade association would 
have been guilty of the unauthorized practice of law in most juris-
dictions if it had given its members specific advice calling for a 
substantial degree of legal expertise on matters of individual con-
cern. Presumably, attorneys who had aided the association in fram-
ing such advice or who had served as the association's agents in dis-
seminating such advice would have violated canon 47 by having 
aided the unauthorized practice of law. 
B. Canon 35: Intermediaries 
Canon 47 is concerned primarily with the danger of public re-
liance upon advice that is lacking in legal skill or knowledge, but 
other considerations are pertinent to any group legal service plan 
under which an association provides legal advice to its members: 
23. See DRINKER 162-67. 
24. E.g., People v. Merchants Protective Corp., 189 Cal. 531, 209 P. 363 (1922); 
ln re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910). 
25. ABA, OPINIONS OF THE COMM11TEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES, No. 
8, at 71, 75 (1925) [hereinafter OPINIONS]. 
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even if the association provides such advice only through highly 
skilled and knowledgeable attorney-agents, the danger of conflicting 
interests between the association and its members remains. Canon 
35 is primarily concerned with this danger: 
The professional services of lawyer should not be controlled or 
exploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes 
between client and lawyer. A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifica-
tions are individual. He should avoid all relations which direct the 
performance of his duties by or in the interest of such intermediary. 
A lawyer's relation to his client should be personal, and the responsi-
bility should be direct to the client. Charitable societies rendering 
aid to the indigents are not deemed such intermediaries. 
A Ia-wyer may accept employment from any organization, such 
as an association, club or trade organization, to render legal services 
in any matter in which the organization, as an entity, is interested, 
but this employment should not include the rendering of legal 
services to the members of such an organization in respect to their 
individual affairs.2s 
An identity of interest between an association and any particular 
member cannot be assumed.21 This point might appear so obvious 
as to require no citation but for the fact that this indefensible as-
sumption seems partly to underlie the Court's decision in Button.28 
Since a member usually joins an association because of its ability to 
further interests he shares with other association members, conflicts 
of interest between member and association may arise only in subtle 
ways; however, this very subtlety may aggravate the danger of in-
tervention by the association between the member and the attorney 
upon whose undivided loyalty the member relies. 
Contrary to the implication of Button, the mere absence of any 
pecuniary factor does not eliminate the possibility of such conflicts. 
A Negro member of the NAACP, for example, may share with other 
members an interest in the achievement of desegregated education. 
However, it might be in the particular member's best interest to 
seek administrative accommodation or token integration to enable 
his high school youngster to attend a better school; at the same 
time, it might well be in the best interest of the NAACP to seek, 
through this particular member, more protracted litigation aimed 
at complete desegregation, even if such litigation probably would 
not culminate successfully until after the particular member's child 
26. DRINKER 322 (emphasis added). This canon was adopted by the ABA on July 26, 
1928, and amended Aug. 31, 1933. Id. at 309. 
2;/. See, e.g., Lathrop- v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961); Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 
740 (1961). 
28. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 442-43 (1963). 
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had finished his schooling. It might not be difficult for an NAACP 
attorney to persuade the member that hii,; best interests were really 
tied to the long-range interests of the Negro community as a whole, 
as indeed they might be. But is such an attorney capable of ob-
jectively aiding his client to disentangle his particular interests from 
those of the group as a whole? Will such an attorney even be in a 
position to tell the difference? We can translate these considerations 
into the framework of our inquiry simply by noting that similar 
conflicts of interest inevitably must exist between trade associations 
and their members. 
The distinction in canon 35 between the permitted representation 
of an association as an entity and the proscribed rendering of legal 
services to members of the association in respect to their individual 
affairs is responsive to the danger of conflicting interests. The canon 
provides clear practical guidance to both the association attorney and 
the individual member. The former owes his undivided loyalty to 
the association; consequently, when a member becomes aware of a 
possible conflict of interest between himself and the association, he 
should be on adequate notice of the need to employ his own attorney. 
Of course, lay association members cannot always be expected to 
exhibit great sensitivity to potential conflicts of interest. Happily, 
however, the clarity with which the attorney's duty to the association 
stands forth, were he to adhere steadfastly to canon 35, should serve 
to enhance the attorney's own perception of such potential conflicts 
and possibly lead him to issue an appropriate warning to the 
member. Thus, the balance is properly struck, with the primary 
burden on the attorney, who is able to bear it. 
The canon 35 distinction between representing the association 
and representing its members on individual matters is also responsive 
to another concern-the need for a direct and personal relationship 
between attorney and client. The existence of such a relationship 
gives some assurance that the attorney will have access to all the 
information necessary to the formulation of sound legal advice. To 
the extent that an attorney employed by an association limits his 
advice to matters affecting the association as an entity, he will have 
access to all the necessary information in his relationship with his 
employer. Only when the association attorney attempts to advise 
members on individual matters does. the intervention of the associa-
tion undermine the direct personal relationship between attorney 
and client and pose a serious problem of breakdown in vital com-
munication. Of course, in the context of a trade association composed 
of corporate members, it may make little sense to speak in terms 
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of a close personal attorney-client relationship, although the concern 
for directness is still valid. 
A series of opinions of the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics 
and Grievances elaborate upon the canon 35 distinction. Opinion 
829 disapproved of the conduct of lawyers who helped an auto club 
advise its members about their individual affairs. However, this 
opinion prefaced its condemnation with the observation that the 
attorneys were not rendering advice on questions of collective inter-
est to the membership as a whole, implying that such advice might 
not have been proscribed. Focusing on the fact that the advice would 
relate to individual rights, opinion 27030 condemned a proposed 
newspaper column giving legal advice in a question and answer 
format as violative of canon 35 and canon 40, 31 even though the 
attorney-author was to remain anonymous, thereby avoiding any 
problem of solicitation; only questions of general public interest 
were to be answered; the reader was to be cautioned to consult his 
own attorney rather than rely on the published answer; and, the 
columnist was to write with the approach of a lecturer rather than 
that of an adviser on legal rights. Obviously, concern with the need 
for a personal and direct attorney-client relationship was very great 
in this opinion. Opinion 9832 similarly found it to be professionally 
improper for a lawyer to give legal advice through a question and 
answer column in a state bankers' association bulletin in response 
to the inquiries of individual member banks. Opinion 16838 subse-
quently limited opinion 98 by stating that it is ethically proper for 
the general counsel of a trade association to render legal opinions 
upon problems common to all members for distribution among the 
membership, even when the opinion is in response to an inquiry 
from an individual member. This opinion recognized the growing 
need for the economies of scale obtainable only through some form 
of group legal service but continued to emphasize the need for a 
direct attorney-client relationship where members seek advice on 
individual problems.84 
29. OPINIONS 73 (1925). 
30. OPINIONS 560 (1945). 
31. "A lawyer may with propriety write articles for publications in which he gives 
information upon the law; but he should not accept employment from such publica-
tions to advise inquirers in respect to their individual rights." DRINKER 323 (1953). This 
canon was adopted by the ABA on July 26, 1928. Id. at 309. 
32. OPINIONS 214 (1933). 
33. OPINIONS 341 (1937). 
34. OPINIONS, No. 168, at 342 (1937): 
The vast majority of business men cannot afford to retain law firms in their 
constant employ in order to be continually advised upon all these problems [anti-
trust laws, Robinson-Patman Act, and other aspects of increasing state and federal 
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Opinion 273811 reviewed and reaffirmed opinion 168 in deciding 
that it is ethical to give general legal advice on matters of common 
group interest to members of a manufacturers' association through 
the association's trade bulletin. The opinion noted that while the 
fact that advice was prompted by individual members might indi-
cate that the problem primarily concerned them individually, this 
"would not be conclusive, since, as in Opinion 168, individual 
members might ask questions of general interest."86 
Even prior to Button, therefore, a trade association could properly 
advise a member on an individual matter so long as such advice was 
limited to issues of collective interest to members of the association 
and so long as the member was urged to seek the advice of his own 
attorney in the application of such general advice to his particular 
problem. So limited, it seems to be immaterial whether the advice 
was directed to members or nonmembers87 or whether it was solicited 
or unsolicited, even though solicited advice carries with it a greater 
danger of being construed as directed to individual affairs only. It 
is conceivable, however, that advice rendered by a trade association 
could be of sufficient collective interest to the association member-
ship to satisfy the distinction drawn by canon 35 and yet still be 
specific enough and require enough legal skill in its formulation to 
be deemed the unauthorized practice of law. Lawyers who frame 
such advice may therefore violate canon 47 even though their con-
duct is permitted under canon 35 and the opinions thereunder. 
Canon 35's specific exemption of charitable societies which render 
legal aid to indigents demands examination.88 Such agencies, of 
necessity, advise indigents "in respect to their individual affairs." 
Consequently, to the extent that the distinction between general 
advice on matters of collective group interest and specific advice on 
individual problems represents a different degree of danger to the 
public, such group legal services for indigents would seem to pose 
regulation of business]. Hence the cooperative association such as the one here 
described. The giving of advice upon subjects affecting the group is a proper 
function of a lawyer, protecting its members from prosecution, penalty and loss 
and at the same time interpreting the law and encouraging its due observance. 
This is to be clearly distinguished from the purchase by the association of 
advice for an individual member concerning his own peculiar problems and with-
out the full and free disclosure of the factual situation essential to the proper 
relation of attorney and client. 
!!5. OPINIONS 570 (1946). 
!16. OPINIONS, No. 27!!, at 573 (1946). See also AssocIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY 
OF NEW Yorut &: THE NEW Yorut COUNTY'S LAWYERS' AssoCIATION, COMMITTEE ON PRO· 
FESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, No. 804, at 495 (1956). 
!!7. See discussion of canons 27 and 28 in text accompanying notes 39-57 infra. 
38. This exception to the law of maintenance is of very long standing. See 4 W. 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, ch. 10, at 134 (12th ed. 1795). 
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the greatest possible danger. A cynic might suggest that because of 
the absence of legal fees for such work the profession has ignored 
the possible dangers to clients of legal aid societies. More probably, 
because representing indigents obviously entails an economic bur-
den, rather than a profitable opportunity, the organized bar has 
been able objectively to evaluate the necessity for these services and 
has decided that the economies of scale essential to satisfying the 
needs of this segment of the public outweigh the dangers of con-
flicting interests, incompetent advice, and interference with direct 
attorney-client relationships. This balance is more easily struck, since 
the last two dangers can be minimized by requiring legal aid societies 
to act only through qualified attorney-agents who confer personally 
with the indigent clients they represent. Perhaps the formal identi-
fication of this exception in canon 35 will ease the transformation of 
the canon into a new guideline capable of encompassing the addi-
tional exceptions created by Button, BRT, and UMW, where the 
need for some form of group legal services seems similarly to over-
balance their potential for harm. 
C. Canons 27 and 28: Solicitation of Professional Employment 
and Stirring up Litigation, Directly or Through Agents 
Running throughout the other canons and opinions rendered 
thereunder is a general conception of the essential dignity of the 
legal profession. This view-that the attorney's role in society can be 
filled properly only by those who merit the respect of the public and 
of their fellow lawyers by remaining selflessly aloof from the manipu-
lative devices of the competitive marketplace-is expressed most 
directly in canon 27, which condemns advertising and other forms 
of direct or indirect solicitation of professional employment,89 and in 
canon 28: 
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a law-
suit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust 
make it his duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not 
only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It is dis-
reputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of actions and 
inform thereof in order to be employed to bring suit or collect 
judgment, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims 
for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action 
in order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for 
like purposes, or to pay or reward, directly or indirectly, those who 
bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office, or to 
39. DRINKER, 316. This canon was adopted by the ·ABA in 1908 but has under-
gone frequent revision and was last amended in 1963. 
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remunerate policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital 
attaches or others who may succeed, under the guise of giving dis-
interested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick and 
the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his professional services. 
A duty to the public and to the profession devolves upon every 
member of the Bar having knowledge of such practices upon the 
part of any practitioner immediately to inform thereof, to the end 
that the offender may be disbarred.40 
These prohibitions would be ideal in a small town where every-
one knows the reputation of the few solo-practitioner attorneys who 
serve as general family and business advisers; this is especially so if 
we further postulate well-informed citize.ns, aware of their rights 
under the law or, at least, aware of the need to seek legal advice in 
appropriate circumstances, and on a close enough personal basis with 
the town's attorneys to feel free to seek such advice. In such a town, 
strict observance of canons 27 and 2_8 would not only assure the 
lawyers some measure of community-wide respect, but it would also 
lower the costs of legal service by eliminating those amounts which 
might otherwise be spent on advertising and sundry solicitation 
activity. Furthermore, the legal talent of the community would be 
put to its best use-providing legal services-rather than being 
wastefully diverted into business-getting efforts. To the extent that 
there is complete dissemination of accurate information on the 
qualifications and experience of the town's lawyers and to the extent 
that attorney selection is based rationally on this information, ex-
cellence would be encouraged, for the best attorney would attract 
the best or most lucrative work in the greatest volume without the 
distorting effect of solicitation. 
Unfortunately, this hypothetical town has no real counterpart 
today. Even in the smaller towns, long recognized as the model for 
the canons dealing with "business-getting,''41 the poorer residents are 
less likely to be aware of their legal rights than their more affluent 
neighbors; people on the wrong side of the tracks generally do not 
form the close personal relationships with attorneys that would 
permit them comfortably to seek advice. In a more realistic context, 
therefore, while enforcement of canons 27 and 28 might enhance 
respect for the profession, it would remove only the crassest forms of 
solicitation, leaving the more subtle devices of utilizing family ties, 
entertaining, and trading on political influence. These techniques 
40. DRINKER 319. This canon was adopted by the ABA on August 27, 1908, and 
amended slightly in 1928. Id. at 309, 319. 
41. Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles and Poultices-&nd Cures1, 5 LAw &: CoNTEMP. 
PROB, 104, 115 (1938). 
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also have great potential for distortion of rational attorney selection 
on the basis of reputed merit. Thus, the cost of enforcing these canons 
is unequal justice in the form of more unrighted wrongs against the 
poor and ignorant than against the rich and informed. 
Moreover, the idealized small town is totally inappropriate as a 
model for today's densely populated urban centers, where anonymity 
is a fact of life. Generally, only the major consumers of the highest 
priced legal services, who have great economic interests at stake, are 
able to make a fully informed, rational selection of legal counsel. 
The vast majority of middle and lower income individuals, as well 
as many small businesses, cannot afford the best-knmm lawyers in 
town and must make their selection from among the less well-knmm 
on the basis of fragmentary information and word-of-mouth recom-
mendations which may be no more conducive to rational choice than 
are open solicitation and advertising. Indeed, one wonders if the 
latter would not actually be more likely to result in an informed and 
rational selection. Perhaps our general faith in competition would 
be borne out in this context also. It is at least arguable that, in an 
urban center, any enhancement of public esteem for the bar achieved 
by enforcement of canons 27 and 28 may be more than offset by the 
experience of those who, because of their inability to acquire ade-
quate information, either fail to retain any counsel or select an 
attorney who turns out to be unqualified to handle their particular 
problems. Of course this lottery aspect of attorney selection is com-
pounded by the inability or unwillingness of the organized bar to 
set up objective tests for specialty designation.42 
Even the assumed premise underlying canons 27 and 28-that it is 
improper for attorneys to assert commercial self-interest-may no 
longer be valid. When the professions were the exclusive province 
of upper class men of independent means, noblesse oblige may have 
been a reasonable normative expectation.43 However, as education 
has become more universally available, many people enter the pro-
fessions with no other means of support. Furthermore, the current 
trend toward larger law firms has had the effect of placing many 
attorneys in an employee relationship, severely straining the cher-
ished image of professional independence epitomized by the solo 
practitioner. Canon 35 admonishes attorneys not to permit their 
professional services to be exploited by lay agencies, but this pro-
42. Report of the Committee on Recognition and Regnlation of Specialization Law 
Practice (unpublished 1963) cited in Schwartz, Forward: Group Legal Services in 
Perspective, 12 U.C_.L,A.L. REv. 279, 294 (1965). 
43. R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 51-55 (195!1) (history 
of remuneration of advocates in ancient Rome). 
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scription sounds rather hollow in light of the widespread utilization 
of hired associates by large law firms today. There has been growing 
recognition in other disciplines of a similar change in the character 
of the professions. Teachers have unionized;44 medical doctors have 
brought down the government of Belgium by a threatened strike 
for higher wages;45 and, the Reverend William H. DuBay has even 
attempted to unionize his fellow priests for several purposes, includ-
ing establishment of "a 'professional salary' for priests that would 
eliminate their 'dependence on the wealthy.' "46 
The relationship between the changing nature of the legal pro• 
fession and the anti-solicitation canons is somewhat paradoxical. As 
the status of an attorney in a big firm approaches that of an em-
ployee, dependent for his livelihood upon a salary and bonus, his 
assertion of some element of commercial self-interest seems increas-
ingly reasonable. However, in the big firm there is specialization in 
the business-getting function as in all others, and the typical associate 
is under little or no pressure in this regard. On the contrary, he is 
generally urged to concentrate his efforts on serving clients which the 
partners have attracted. Therefore, during the time that an attorney 
is an associate employee of a large firm, the public is usually insulated 
from his direct assertions of economic self interest by the interven-
tion of the firm itself. When the attorney graduates to the managerial 
role of partner, although he would stand to benefit more directly 
from solicitation, he generally will have little need to engage in such 
conduct: he will be more independent in a personal financial sense; 
he will inherit an established clientele with a natural rate of expan-
sion, both in terms of the growth of smaller clients into larger ones 
and in terms of the attraction of new clients through the recom-
mendation of old ones; and, to the extent that big firms tend to 
service only the bigger and better-informed clients, the direct forms 
of solicitation proscribed by the canons would be less effective than 
the more subtle forms which are properly available. 
Thus, the antisolicitation canons seem to have the greatest dis-
advantageous impact upon the solo practitioner or smaller firm, and 
44. N.Y. Times, March 12, 1966, at 1, col. 5. 
45. N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1966, at 1, col. 7. See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1965, at 12, 
col. 5 (4,000 doctors and medical students strike over pay and working conditions in 
Mexico); N.Y. Times, March 9, 1965, at 11, col. 1 (doctors strike threat in Great 
Britain recedes when Prime Minister Wilson announces that government will distribute 
$15.4 million in pay increases); N.Y. Times, April 12, 1965, at 8, col. 7 (20,000 doctors 
in Italian public hospitals strike for higher pay and improved conditions). 
46. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1966, at 25, col. 1. For a discussion of the reaction to Father 
DuBay's proposal, see N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1966, § 4 (The News of the Week in Review), 
at 8, col. 1. 
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upon the least well-informed elements of the public. The smaller 
firm, carried to the logical extreme in the solo practitioner, defies 
the trend toward an initial employee status. Active solicitation would 
be most tempting to the small firm or solo practitioner whose eco-
nomic self-interest can be directly satisfied by attracting more legal 
work. At least initially, the small firm or solo practitioner has no 
self-generating client base. Furthermore, because the potential clients 
of these smaller units of practice are generally smaller and less well-
informed, solicitation might prove most effective. One ironic conse-
quence of the continued enforcement of the traditional antisolicita-
tion canons, therefore, would seem to be an acceleration of the 
growth of large firms and the demise of the small firms and solo 
practitioners which served as the model for these canons. 
Entirely apart from considerations relating to the maintenance 
of public respect for the legal profession, the antisolicitation canons 
may serve an independent public interest by limiting the demands 
upon our legal and judicial resources. Professor Hart has described 
the pyramidal nature of our appellate system, noting that only a 
small fraction of those conflicting human interactions and decisions 
at the base, which could give rise to litigation, actually end up in 
the courts, and only a small percentage of these litigated issues ever 
reach each succeeding appellate level of the pyramid. Hart suggests 
that even the relatively few cases that reach the highest level of the 
pyramid impose a severe strain upon the limited judicial resources of 
the Supreme Court, which must depend upon the comprehensibility 
and persuasiveness of its reasoning for any meaningful impact upon 
the countless private decisions made at the base of the pyramid;n 
Perhaps this whole system can function only if litigated conflicts are 
restricted to those which sufficiently interest the affected parties to 
spur them out of the inertia of repose into actions which they initiate 
themselves, without the added stimulus of prodding attorneys 
desirous of increasing the demand for their services. 
However, there certainly are recognized exceptions to this gen-
eral framework, as, for instance, where Congress specifically chooses 
to rely upon and encourage private lawsuits as a means of enforcing 
federal policies. In 111.agida v. Continental Can Co.,48 the district 
court, with obvious distaste, awarded attorney's fees after the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit had held that the rights of the 
company and its stockholders cannot be thwarted by proving that 
the true party in interest in a 16(b) insider trading suit was plaintiff's 
47. Hart, The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REY. 84, 96 (1959). 
48. 176 F. Supp. 781, 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). 
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attorney, who had instigated the suit in order to obtain a fee in viola-
tion of New York penal provisions.49 The district court noted that 
Congress apparently "regards public policy against proved and re-
peated violations of fiduciary responsibility by corporate officers at 
the expense of the public more detrimental to public good than the 
violation of generally accepted ethics by attorneys."50 
Even in the absence of such a congressionally articulated counter-
vailing policy, one could criticize the notion of limited judicial re-
sources as suggesting that the ignorant be perpetually discriminated 
against by silencing the one informed group that might have a vested 
interest in dispelling their ignorance. Clearly, failure to litigate an 
unknown right does not indicate insubstantiality of interest. If a 
better-informed public would cast an unbearable burden upon our 
present judicial resources, perhaps the best solution would be for 
us to shore up our judicial resources rather than to inhibit those 
forces that would otherwise tend to create a greater awareness of 
rights.51 Furthermore, not every newly discovered right will neces-
sarily lead to litigation and added strain on the courts. Attorneys 
probably will have the greatest incentive to inform others of their 
rights when this information is more likely to lead to a private settle-
ment than to a trial.52 
The doctrines of barratry, champerty, and maintenance-the 
forerunners of canons 27 and 28-arose in feudal England when lords 
and large landowners bought up contested claims against each other 
or against commoners to harrass those in possession and to increase 
their holdings. The primitive procedures and record systems of those 
times were an invitation to false claims by the powerful against the 
weak.113 However, Radin suggests that roles have been reversed_ in 
modern times: "If in medieval England, powerful men oppressed 
their weaker fellow subjects by maintaining suits against them, in 
modern society powerful people are more likely to achieve their 
ends by daring their victims to maintain suits."114 In 1921, Pound 
warned us that by discouraging litigation we run the danger of en-
couraging wrongdoing.115 
49. N.Y. Penal Law § 274 (1944). 
50. 176 F. Supp. at 783. 
51. See N.Y. Times, March 6, 1966, § I, at I, col. I, for the report of a novel effort 
to enlarge the New York State judiciary by a suit based on the Supreme Court's "one 
man-one vote" principle. 
52. In a personal interview, a partner in a large midwestem law firm informed the 
author that litigation is the least remunerative of their various departments and is 
maintained only to satisfy the expectation of their clients for continuity of service. 
53. Hovey v. Hobson, 51 Me. 62, 64 (1863). 
54. Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REv. 48, 77 (1935). 
55. R. POUND, SPIRIT OF THE CoMMON LAW 134 (1921). . . 
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The antisolicitation canons seem less open to criticism in the 
trade association context. Opinions 168 and 273, discussed earlier,56 
clearly contemplate that attorneys employed by trade associations 
will be permitted to inform association members of their legal rights 
and duties as they affect the whole group. These generally corporate 
members are also likely to have their own counsel to advise them on 
individual matters. Such well-informed association members possess 
knowledge of their rights and the ability to protect their interests; 
the same cannot be said of those for whom the antisolicitation 
canons may foreclose the only effective means of enlightenment about 
rights and legal action. Also, the arguments in favor of canons 27 
and 28 are strongest in this same trade association context. Solicita-
tion which merely gives the poor and the ignorant an even break by 
apprising them of unknown rights may enhance rather than detract 
from respect for the legal profession; on the other hand, solicitation 
among the affluent members of a trade association, beyond what 
is already implicitly permitted by canon 35 and the opinions there-
under, would represent a contest for business which, although praised 
as free competition in other commercial contexts, might well be 
viewed by the public as unbecoming and greedy when carried on by 
lawyers. 
Even so, a trade association attorney might be justified in sending 
nonmembers information if this should become tactically important 
in the proper representation of the collective interests of the associa-
tion. There is a danger, however, that such action might be con-
sidered stirring up litigation. Opinion 957 proscribed the conduct of 
an attorney who sent to presumptive nonclient claimants against 
the Mexican government a circular letter informing them of impor-
tant developments with respect to their claims, but this prohibition 
would not necessarily control in a case where such information is 
sent by a trade association which has a valid interest in seeing these 
claims collected. 
Problems of direct solicitation can be avoided by omitting the 
association attorney's name from all advice rendered to trade associ-
ation members and to nonmembers. As long as the advice is limited 
to general matters of collective interest to the association as a whole, 
there would seem to be no problem of indirect solicitation, even if 
the association advertised the availability of such legal advice as a 
membership inducement, unless a particular jurisdiction considered 
such advice to be specific enough and require sufficient legal skill in 
its formulation to constitute the unauthorized practice of law. 
56. See text accompanying notes 35-37 supra. 
57. OPINIONS 76, 78 (1926). 
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II. THE IMPACT OF BurroN, BRT, AND UMW 
Although Button protects association and group legal services for 
the purpose of promoting civil rights, and BRT and UMW extend 
this protection to association for the purpose of promoting members' 
pecuniary interests, all share a common thread: they are seen by the 
Court as noble efforts on the part of the exploited to gain, through 
organization, the strength they must have if they are to obtain that 
which is rightfully theirs. Perhaps there is a hierarchy of first amend-
ment rights, and only those with an equivalently poignant claim will 
be constitutionally protected against state regulation, despite the 
Court's frequent statements to the effect that the marketplace of 
ideas welcomes the unpopular and iconoclastic as well as the morally 
righteous. Although some decisions inhibiting the associational rights 
of unpopular and "morally reprehensible" groups are grounded on 
the greater danger to society they in fact pose,58 at least one such case 
cannot be so explained. In Konigsberg v. State Bar,59 the Court 
chilled the associational rights of potential members of the Commu-
nist Party by upholding Konigsberg's exclusion from the California 
Bar for refusing to answer questions about possible membership in 
the Communist Party. Konigsberg had explicitly and uncontro-
vertedly stated that he did not believe in the forceful overthrow 
of the United States Government, and consequently the danger to 
society was far from immediate.60 It is unclear how the different treat-
ment afforded the two extreme groups, saints and sinners, may 
extend to the many gradations in between. There are obvious and 
serious dangers in any such subjective distinction, based as it must 
be on the personal value systems of the Justices, especially in the 
context of a difficult first and fourteenth amendment balancing 
test which invites self-deceptive rationalization. Nevertheless, a prag-
matist in search of the boundaries of Button, BRT, and UMW 
could not ignore this potential limiting factor. Although the first 
amendment would seem to protect the rich and the poor alike, the 
Court may be less solicitous of the associational rights of the afB.uent 
58. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 6!1 (1928) (Knights of 
the Ku Klux Klan). 
59. !166 U.S. !16 (1961). 
60. !166 U.S. at !18 n.l (majority opinion), at 60 (Black, J. dissenting). Compare 
NAACP v. Alabama, !157 U.S. 449 (1958) (manifesting an undeniably greater solicitude 
for the associational rights of NAACP members): Uphaus v. Wyman, !160 U.S. 72 
(1959) (upholding the interest of the state in the investigation of potential subversive 
activities through a legislative investigating committee as outweighing individual rights 
in associational privacy) with Jordan v. Hutcheson, !12!1 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 196!1) (up-
holding jurisdiction of federal court to enjoin a state legislative committee from in-
vestigating NAACP attorneys when such investigation intrudes upon the constitutionally 
protected associational rights of the attorneys carved out by Button). 
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and relatively powerful members-neither saints nor sinners-of a 
trade association organized for economic purposes than it has been 
for the less affluent, weaker, and perhaps more "saintly" members of 
the NAACP and labor unions. · 
A. Reaction of the Organized Bar 
At least some thoughtful attorneys, even before UMW was decided, 
viewed Button and BRT as permitting all forms of group legal 
services. After an exhaustive two-year study, the Committee of the 
California Bar on Group Legal Services published a progress report61 
on July 30, 1964, which considered and rejected the suggestion that 
group legal service arrangements should be limited to nonprofit as-
sociations, where legal services are provided only for matters of 
peculiarly common concern, and where lawyers' fees are paid by 
the individual member-client. This committee, claiming that it had 
taken the public interest as its only polestar, found a substantial 
unfilled public nee·d for legal services and concluded with the 
recommendation that the Canons be modified to permit every form 
of group legal service plan, specifically mentioning trade associations 
.as illustrative of organizations for which such group legal service 
plans would be appropriate. 
However, this view was not unanimous. The ABA Standing 
Committee on Unauthorized Practice rejected the final conclusion 
of the California Progress Report at its regular meeting in Atlanta on 
October 4, 1964.62 In a letter to state and local bar associations fol-
lowing the Supreme Court's denial of rehearing in BRT on June l, 
1964, the ABA reaffirmed its support of the Canons of Professional 
Ethics in their present form and suggested that each association 
advise its membership that, so far as the conduct of individual 
lawyers is concerned, BRT does not give a "license to solicit" and 
that soliciting or any other violation of the Canons would, as before, 
result in disciplinary action.63 This letter was followed by a resolu-
tion strongly reaffirming the ban on solicitation passed by the Board 
of Governors and the House of Delegates at the ABA's midwinter 
meeting, held in New Orleans in February, 1965.64 
61. Committee Report on Group Legal Services, 39 J. ST. B. CALIF. 639 (1964). 
62. 30 UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE NEWS 265 (1964). See Cheatham, Availability of 
Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Individual Lawyer and of the Organized Bar, 
12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 438, 452-56 (1965), in which the author attempts to dichotomize 
groups into organizations which provide services to and organizations which obtain 
services for their members, suggesting that Button and BRT have no direct bearing 
on the latter category which, according to Cheatham, would include trade associations. 
63. 30 UNAUTHORIZED PRAcrICE NEWS 365 (1964-1965). 
64. Id. 
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Nor was the California Committee itself undivided on this ques-
tion. Specific arguments against the committee's broad view were 
made in minority reports by Arthur H. Connolly, Jr.65 and Frank 
Simpson, III.66 Mr. Connolly saw the majority report as impaled on 
the horns of a dilemma-either a double standard would result under 
which lawyers not affiliated with groups would be required to adhere 
to the traditional strict Canons while their group-affiliated brethren 
would enjoy the benefits of advertising, solicitation, and channelling, 
or the prohibitions against advertising and solicitation would have 
to be removed as to the entire bar, a move the committee did not 
seem prepared to suggest. Mr. Simpson perceptively noted that not 
all forms of group legal services run afoul of the present Canons. He 
did not find the evidence persuasive on the more refined question 
of whether the functional utility of those types of group legal services 
presently forbidden was sufficiently compelling to require changes 
in the rules of professional conduct. 
The full, thoughtful reaction of the organized Bar to Button, 
BRT, and UMW is only now beginning to be heard. Mr. Louis 
Powell, when president of the ABA, appointed Edward L. Wright of 
Little Rock, Arkansas, to chair a special committee on the re-evalua-
tion of the Canons. Mr. Powell also appointed Mr. William Mc-
Calpin of St. Louis, Missouri, to serve as chairman of a special 
committee on the availability of legal services.67 Mr. McCalpin's 
committee recently released its recommendation and report. Action 
is expected to be taken on it at the 1968 Annual Meeting of the 
ABA's House of Delegates. The committee construed its mission as 
limited to the formulation of recommended policy, and it did not 
attempt to translate this policy into specific amendment of existing 
Canons. This latter task, presumably, is the one which confronts Mr. 
Wright's committee. 
The main thrust of the recommendation and report is to suggest, 
in general terms, that there should be a presumption in favor of per-
mitting individual members of common-interest groups68 to receive 
65. Connolly, Minority Report I, Committee Report on Group Legal Services, 39 
J. ST. Il, CALIF. 639, 737 (1964). 
66. Simpson, Minority Report II, Committee Report on Group Legal Services, 39 
J. ST. B. CALIF. 639, 730 (1964). 
67. See Powell, The President's Page, 50 A.B.A.J. 1005 (1964). For an illustration of 
Mr. McCalpin's views, which seem to have been more flexible and receptive to innova-
tion in the use of group legal service pleas to satisfy the unmet needs of the public 
than the official hard line previously adopted by the ABA, see McCalpin, The Bar Faces 
Forward, 51 A.B.A.J. 548 (1965). 
68. In its report the committee clearly indicated that its recommendation contem-
plated group legal services for "trade and industry associations" and other "groups of 
individuals and/or corporations sharing common economic interests •••• " ABA, RE-
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legal services rendered by lawyers obtained either by the group or 
by some other agency interested in securing such services for the 
members, if safeguards can be imposed to protect essential public 
interests. The committee considered these essential public interests to 
be: (1) the independent exercise of the lawyer's professional judg-
ment; and (2) the preservation of the practice of law as a profession. 
Conflicts of interest and third-party control were recognized as the 
operative reagents in group legal service arrangements most likely 
to corrode these values. The committee recommended five minimum 
safeguards: 
(I) The lawyer participating in any group arrangement shall 
himself in all respects be governed and bound by the Canons of 
Ethics; 
(2) The advertising and solicitation activities of the entity pro-
viding the services of the lawyer shall conform to professional stand-
ards applicable to all lawyers with respect to misrepresentation and 
overreaching; 
(3) If the group exists or is operated primarily for the purpose of 
providing to its members the services of a lawyer, the charges col-
lected by the group from its members whether in the form of dues 
or otherwise shall not in the aggregate exceed the compensation 
paid by the group to the lawyer plus the reasonable cost of administer-
ing the group arrangement; 
(4) There shall be a written contract of employment between 
the lawyer and the group or entity providing his services which 
contract shall substantially embody the provisions of paragraphs (1), 
(2) and (3) hereof, shall provide that in the event of any breach of 
such provisions the lawyer shall terminate the contract and his re-
lationship with the group or entity, that the lawyer (despite his 
relationship to the group) shall be unqualifiedly independent of 
any obligation to anyone other than the member of the group whom 
he serves, that his obligation shall in all events be directly and solely 
to the member of the group whom he serves and that neither the 
group nor any other member thereof shall interfere or attempt to 
interfere with the lawyer's independent exercise of his professional 
judgment and such contract shall be filed with the appropriate 
agency having the responsibility for regulating the conduct of the 
lawyer participating in the group arrangement; and 
(5) The participating lawyer shall not have taken any part not 
justified by his prior relationship with the group in promoting either 
the creation of the group itself or the establishment of its legal 
services program and shall not have solicited his own employment 
with the organization. 69 
PORT OF THE SPECIAL CoMMilTEE ON THE AVAILABILITY OF l.EGAL SERVICES 8 (1968) 
[hereinafter CoMMITrEE Rfil>ORT]. 
69. ABA, RECOMMENDATION OF THE SPECIAL COMMI1TEE ON THE AVAILABILITY OF 
LEGAL SERVICES 2-!I (1968). 
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In light of the status of the present Canons, the first safeguard 
listed begs the questions dealt with in this Article. The attempt to 
retain the flavor of the present Canons is understandable, however, 
in light of the quiet revolution this committee has undertaken. 
Although only general observation can be made about these 
recommendations, it is worth remarking that the five safeguards 
seem suffused with a nostalgia for the ancien regime as it existed be-
fore Button, BRT, and UMW. There is thus a grudging refusal to 
face squarely the peculiar problems of those varieties of group legal 
service arrangements which, although proscribed by the Canons, are 
arguably protected by the Supreme Court. Point five is illustrative: 
"Why should an attorney not be permitted to seek employment with 
a group legal service program when he is permitted to seek employ-
ment with a large firm? 
Moreover, the committee's report is perhaps to glib in assuming 
that the measures it proposes will be adequate even as minimum 
safeguards to protect against serious conflicts of interest; the report 
can be criticized for failing to perceive or deal with the serious 
consequences that might flow from rather subtle conflicts of interest. 
The report does, however, attempt to deal with a collateral problem: 
the dilemma between permitting solicitation by all lawyers and, on 
the other hand, discriminating between lawyers who are affiliated 
with groups and those who are not. The committee resolves this 
dilemma by recommending both "a limited relaxation of ... [solicita-
tion] bans where the public may be served"70 and even-handed en-
forcement of the second of the safeguards listed above. 
The report may be overly concerned with third-party profit as an 
influence destructive of the lawyer's independence of professional 
judgment, for it fails to consider the possible contribution "profit" 
might make in the sphere of legal services by fulfilling its traditional 
resource-allocative, efficiency-rewarding function. On the other hand, 
the committee may have been insufficiently concerned about the more 
subtle forms of administrative control inherent in any large organiza-
tion which operate quite apart from the profit motive. 
It may be impossible to adjust the regulation of group legal 
service arrangements to respond to the differences between group 
legal service recipients, who may vary greatly in both sophistication 
and capacity for self-protection against conflicts of interest. But, 
whether impossible or not, the problem is a real one which ap-
parently received no attention from the committee. 
The committee found the answer to the question of whether 
70. CoMMITIEE REPORT 23. 
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there is an unmet need for group legal services in the repeated efforts 
of extraordinarily diverse groups of the lay public to secure legal 
services on bases other than those which the profession traditionally 
has provided. The report does perform an important public service 
by assisting the organized bar in accommodating gracefully to 
long-ignored realities. Not the least important contribution is the 
following overdue observation: 
[I]n the past group arrangements with scarcely distinguishable 
essential features have received widely varied treatment at the hands 
of ethics committees and the courts. Recognizing this, we adopted a 
-definition broad enough to bring within its ambit all programs with 
essential similarities without regard to past proscription or accept-
ance so that the subject could be approached on a rational rather 
than an historical basis.11 
Perhaps the most serious defect in the report is the refusal to 
deal seriously with the possible decline in the size and strength 
of the independent privately practicing bar--of ultimate disadvan-
tage to the public-which might result from a proliferation of group 
legal services. Although recognizing this as a legitimate and important 
concern, the committee members were content to defer to the de-
cision of the marketplace on this issue. It seems to this author that 
the concept of a profession entails a commitment to exercise judg-
ment and to adhere to standards of conduct which might not be 
supported _in a purely democratic poll. The report does refer to the 
use of insurance as a device which potentially offers the benefits of 
economies of scale while retaining the possibility of individual 
attorney choice and independent attorney-client relationships. This 
indeed may be the needed answer. 
In a brief concurring report, three members of the committee 
noted that, in their judgment, the recommendation and report were 
logically demanded by UMW. The forces for change, awakened and 
energized by the three landmark pronouncements of the Supreme 
Court, are beginning to be felt in new places. It will be interesting 
to watch the ABA's ultimate response to this new thrust. 
B. Due Process Balancing Tests: Some Suggested 
Considerations 
Certain factors not discussed in Button, BRT, and UMW might 
prove useful in constructing a theoretical basis for limiting these 
decisions through the use of the very due process balancing test which 
71. COMMITl'EE R.EP<>RT 8. 
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they implicitly apply. The Court might find it desirable to give 
greater weight to state judgments about legal ethics in recognition 
of the fact that the basic allocation of power in our federal system 
imposes upon the states the primary responsibility for the regulation 
of conduct in the public interest. 72 Such a view would justify a 
change in judicial attitude which would be more a difference in 
degree than in kind-a somewhat greater deference on the part of 
the Supreme Court to a state's view of the public interest as mani-
fested in statutory or court-made rules of ethical conduct. 
It might appear that such an approach is no longer possible or 
appropriate after the recent Supreme Court decisions imposing 
federal constitutional standards of criminal procedure upon the 
states. There is, however, an important qualitative difference be-
tween state legislative judgments in the substantive area of profes-
sional ethics and state legislative judgments on questions of criminal 
procedure. As Justice Harlan pointed out in the latter context in his 
separate opinion in In re Gault: 
The legislative judgments at issue here embrace assessments of the 
necessity and wisdom of procedural guarantees; these are questions 
which the Constitution has entrusted at least in part to courts, and 
upon which courts have been understood to possess particular 
competence . 
. . . The procedural framework is here a principal element of the 
substantive legislative system; meaningful deference to the latter must 
include a portion of deference to the former. The substantive-
procedural dichotomy is, nonetheless, an indispensable tool of analy-
sis, for it stems from fundamental limitations upon judicial authority 
under the Constitution. Its premise is ultimately that courts may 
not substitute for the judgments of legislators their own under-
standing of the public welfare, but must instead concern themselves 
with the validity under the Constitution of the methods which the 
legislature has selected.73 
State judgments upon the ethics of the legal profession are not 
subject to the peculiar tensions of the criminal procedure area; 
determinations concerning professional ethics have a less obvious 
effect on individual constitutional rights and appear more appro-
priate for legislative treatment. Thus, total disregard for the states' 
efforts to define workable ethical standards is perhaps undesirable. 
The protection of the conflicting interests of individual dissenting 
72. This may have been a significant influence in Justice Harlan's dissent in UMW. 
See note 8 supra. 
73. 387 U.S. I, 70 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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members is another potential limiting factor in any effort to define 
the scope of the associational rights of a group majority. The Su-
preme Court has dealt only inconclusively with this question.u As 
has already been pointed out, conflicts of interest between a member 
and his group are inevitable; when a group sponsors litigation for 
its members these sometimes subtle but important conflicts may be 
overlooked to the detriment of an individual member. Assuming the 
appropriate safeguard of compulsory full disclosure on the part of 
group-affiliated attorneys, these inevitable conflicts between groups 
and their members might be tolerable as long as the dissenting mem-
bers can find adequate representation of their interests. However, 
alteration of the Canons to permit extensive utilization of group 
legal service plans may so accelerate the trend toward group affilia-
tion and the demise of the solo practitioner that the pool of un~ 
affiliated attorneys in a position to represent dissenting members will 
be too small and poorly qualified to meet this need. There will always 
be a cadre of competent attorneys available to represent affluent 
dissenting members if the demand warrants it, but what of the less 
than affluent? 
One possible solution to this problem is for the dissenting 
74. In two cases involving the propriety of using group funds to pursue political 
objectives not shared by all group members-International Association of Machinists 
v, Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961) and Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961)-the Court 
struggled inconclusively to accommodate vigorous expression of dissenting political 
viewpoints with the group majority's interest in joining together to promote its com-
mon concern more effectively. In the Street case the Court interpreted the Railway 
Labor Act, which authorizes union-shop agreements, to deny to a union the right to 
use an employee's dues to support, over his objections, a political cause which he 
opposes. The majority opinion thus avoided constitutional issues, though only because 
Justice Douglas, who was willing to rest his decision on constitutional grounds, joined 
in Justice Brennan's opinion to provide a majority judgment. Gustices Harlan and 
Frankfurter thought the questioned union practice permissible on both statutory and 
constitutional grounds. Justice Black wished to strike so much of the statute as he 
deemed to violate the first amendment. Justice Whittaker agreed with the majority's 
statutory construction, but thought that the proper remedy was an injunction against 
enforcement of so much of the union-shop agreement as violated the statute. The ma-
jority voted to remand with instructions to the state court to provide an appropriate 
remedy to safeguard the objecting member's rights.) In the Lathrop case the Court 
found no unconstitutionality in a statute requiring all members of the bar of a state 
to enroll in a state bar and pay dues. The majority did not deal with the question 
whether the state bar could then use such dues to support, over the objections of a 
member, legislative proposals with which the member did not agree. Justices Harlan 
and Frankfurter concurred, but on the grounds that the constitutional issue raised was 
without merit. Justice Whittaker concurred, stating his belief that there was nothing 
unconstitutional in requiring payment for the privilege to practice law. Justices Black 
dissented on the grounds that forced use of dues money to support a political object 
opposed by a member violates the first amendment. Justice Douglas dissented on the 
grounds that the forced association of the state bar violated the first amendment. Since 
a group levy, if permitted as in Lathrop, could have sapped some of the dissenters' 
resources and thereby promoted the majority's contrary political view in either of these 
cases, it is unclear how heavily the Court will weigh dissenting members' interests. 
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members to ally themselves with another group which shares their 
interest, and which, therefore, has the incentive and possibly the 
resources to finance litigation by the dissident members. The perfect 
mating of interest would arise where the dissident members had 
standing to litigate against their original group but lacked financing 
and the second group, sharing the dissidents' goals, had finances but 
lacked standing.711 Of course this solution will not always be avail-
able. The financing group may often have standing of its own. Dis-
senting members may not be aware of the existence of other groups 
which share their conflict. In fact, such other groups may not always 
exist. However, the assumed premise upon which the problem of a 
scarcity of unaffiliated attorneys becomes serious-a greatly increased 
utilization of group legal service plans with a consequent increase in 
attorney affiliation with groups-would also seem to entail a sub-
stantial increase in the actual number of groups that maintain legal 
staffs. The probability, therefore, that a dissenting member can and 
will find a kindred spirit in another group should be enhanced under 
75. This pattern is strikingly illustrated by a series of cases involving milk pro-
ducer cooperatives. Milk production varies from season to season, whereas demand for 
milk remains fairly constant throughout the year. This economic fact of life worked 
havoc with the price individual milk-producing farmers could obtain until the federal 
government encouraged their organization into cooperatives capable of stabilizing milk 
prices at higher levels. The cooperatives wanted all milk producers, nonmembers as 
well as members, to bear the cost of this cooperative effort from which they all 
derived benefit. Some nonmember milk producers wanted to maximize their profits 
by selling at the higher price achieved by the cooperatives while maintaining lower 
costs through avoidance of financial participation in the maintenance of the coopera-
tives. The cooperatives succeeded in denying this "free ride" to the nonmembers by 
inducing the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate an order under section B(c) of the 
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 which fixed uniform prices to be paid 
to all producers with certain amounts deducted for special payment directly to the 
cooperatvie marketing associations. The nonmembers claimed that these deductions 
and payments to the cooperatives unlawfully diverted funds which belonged to them as 
producers. However, even though the independent milk farmers themselves lacked the 
financial resources necessary to make this claim effective in a test case, in the wings 
stood an affluent group of milk handlers, middlemen who bought from milk farmers 
and sold to wholesale and retail dealers, who shared the nonmembers' antipathy toward 
the cooperatives, albeit from a different vantage point. These handlers saw themselves 
in a profit margin squeeze between the retail market and the ever-increasing prices 
successfully demanded by the powerful cooperatives. They were interested in exploiting, 
any possibility of undermining the cooperatives and felt that to the extent they could 
encourage more farmers to try for the "free ride," the power and price demands of the 
cooperatives would diminish. In United States v. Rock Royal Co-op, 307 U.S. 533 
(1939), the handlers mounted their own attack against the required payments to 
cooperatives but the Supreme Court held that they lacked standing because they had 
no financial interest in the fund collected. Id. at 561. Thus the stage was set for a 
perfect marriage of interests. Both handlers and nonmember milk farmers wanted 
to strike down the Secretary's order. The handlers, who could afford to litigate, lacked 
the standing requisite to an attack. The nonmember farmers seemed to have the 
necessary standing but lacked the financial resources needed to bring suit. Financed 
by the handlers, the nonmember farmers first established their standing to sue for 
an injunction against the Secretary of Agriculture, Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 
(1944), and then successfully attacked the order, Brannon v. Stark, 342 U.S. 451 (1952), 
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tliis premise. Nevertheless, it would not be unreasonable for a state 
to view with alarm the transformation of its judicial system from an 
institution that traditionally provided justice for all into one that 
merely offered justice for all gTOups; and, such a consequence is not 
unlikely if the trend toward gTeater utilization of gToup legal 
services continues. 
It has been suggested that what is really at issue in Button and 
BRT is economic due process, and that BRT merely serves as a 
reductio ad absurdum of the first amendment basis of decision in 
Button.76 This would be true a fortiori of UMW. Yet, apart from the 
difficulty of separating the right to associate with other like-minded 
people for the purpose of advancing shared political views from the 
right to associate with others for the purpose of making the effective 
expression of these views economically feasible, the substitution 
of an economic for a qualitative first amendment or political element 
in the due process analysis does not seem to assist materially in the 
resolution of the difficult questions underlying a rather open-ended 
and subjective balancing test. It might be thought that such an 
economic due process analysis would at least make it possible to 
place the case of the trade association, comprised of affluent mem-
bers and organized for economic purposes, beyond the reach of 
Button, BRT, and UMW. Prohibition of gToup legal services in the 
latter cases would arguably have made it economically impossible for 
members to have had an effective opportunity to secure their federal 
and state rights in litigation; as to trade associations, however, 
surely the due process clause does not secure to everyone the right to 
spend his fortune in the most efficient way possible, regardless of 
countervailing state interests. Even if the Court were to shift to an 
economic due process theory, however, an argument could be made 
for allowing trade associations to provide gTOUp legal services with 
regard to matters so highly specialized as to be economically im-
practical for even relatively affluent association members to handle 
on an individual basis. In fact, the trade association may well be 
more difficult to distinguish from Button, BRT, and UMW on an 
economic due process theory than on a first amendment theory; 
even gTanting the frequent inseparability of economic and political 
elements in expression and association, there may be some matters 
of economic concern to trade associations which are of such minimal 
political impact as not to reach the dignity of first amendment con-
cern. 
76. This observation was made by Professor Paul Freund in lecture to his Constitu• 
r tional Law Class at Harvard University Law School in January of 1965. 
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C. Due Process Balancing Tests: How Do Trade Associations 
Weigh In? 
Under a due process balancing test the Court is faced with 
difficult tasks: weighing the benefits of group legal services against 
the continuing need for protection from the dangers with which the 
traditional Canons were concerned and pitting the idiosyncratic 
interest of an individual against the interest of a group majority. 
In Button, the need for group legal services was great, since all other 
forms of effective expression were choked off and the demands of 
the group were of fundamental political importance. Balanced 
against this was a speculative but potentially serious danger to the 
public inherent in the lowering of professional standards. The Court 
may have reached its decision too easily by largely ignoring the 
latter considerations, but it would be difficult to quarrel with the 
result. 
BRT presented a more difficult choice. Although the Brother-
hood's group legal service plan may once have been essential to 
provide the union members with the power necessary to protect 
their rights in litigation against the mighty railroad interests, it is 
far from clear that this continues to be the case. A history of favorable 
case law and sizeable verdicts seems to indicate that railroad workers' 
claims today represent attractive legal work which many lawyers 
would welcome and could handle adequately. It is true that under 
the union's plan the members enjoy the benefits of economies of 
scale, specialized counsel, and an institutionalized impetus to bring 
suit which make some recovery more likely. However, the existence 
of an alternative means by which the workers' rights can be en-
forced and the fact that the workers' interests are primarily economic 
rather than political suggests that these benefits should weigh less 
heavily in the due process scales than the benefits of the NAACP 
group legal service plan. On the other hand, the danger inherent 
in the BR T plan also seems somewhat less. Since the issues in the 
BRT context are straightforward economic ones, subtle conflicts of 
interest between a member and his group are less likely to arise 
and to go unperceived than in Button. The relationship between a 
member and his attorney is likewise more direct, because the attorney 
is hired and paid by the individual worker and not by the union. 
However, the union lawyer typically will be seeking settlement of a 
large volume of claims whereas the NAACP lawyer usually will be 
engaged in a more concentrated effort with protracted test case litiga-
tion on behalf of an individual client. Thus, the danger of individual 
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interests being sacrificed for the sake of wholesale justice is probably 
increased. 
The considerations in UMW are similar to those in BRT. The 
distinction between BRT's channeling of legal work to selected 
attorneys who presumably specialize in and depend upon such cases 
as a major source of income and the UMW direct salary arrange-
ment is not immediately compelling. The facts recited by the Illinois 
Supreme Court, however, flesh out practical consequences of this 
additional step toward depersonalization of the attorney-client rela-
tionship: many union members never saw "their" lawyers until they 
actually appeared before the agency. There is no reason, however, to 
accept this as an inevitable consequence of the kind of financial 
arrangement adopted by the mineworkers' union. Even though this 
plan has been held to be constitutionally protected, local courts 
undoubtedly may still insist upon individual attorney-client con-
sultation and other appropriate safeguards. 
How does the balance in the trade association context compare? 
Certainly, as our trade association has been hypothesized, the bene-
fits of group legal services are neither so obvious nor so compelling 
as in Button. The affiuent members of the trade association en-
visioned by this author would each have their own counsel retained 
for the bulk of their legal work. Likewise, such members would 
know their rights and would be pragmatic in their ·willingness to 
assert them. Nevertheless, group legal services beyond those already 
permitted under the Canons could make it possible for the group 
to litigate, through a member's test case, matters of too little con-
sequence to any member to justify the expense of an individual suit 
but of sufficient cumulative consequence to the group to warrant 
group-financed litigation. Furthermore, group legal services will 
afford members economies of scale in access to specialized counsel 
who might otherwise be unavailable, either because of their high 
cost or distant location, or for example because of the impracticality 
of every trade association member maintaining his own Washington 
counsel in addition to local counsel. These benefits would seem to 
weigh most heavily when they permit the expression of a political 
view that would otherwise remain unexpressed or ineffectively ar-
ticulated, but even in this case, the benefits do not seem to be as 
important as those in Button and may not even be as important as 
those in BRT and UMW. Nevertheless, the other side of the due 
process scale also seems to be lighter; consequently, the balance struck 
in the trade association context may be no more pernicious than that 
which was permitted in Button, BRT, and UMW. That is, the rela-
tively sophisticated, often corporate, members of a trade association 
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should be able to protect themselves against many of the dangers in-
herent in any group legal service plan. They, unlike the NAACP and 
union members, who may be more naive, should be able accurately to 
evaluate the danger of conflicts of interest between themselves and 
their association and to act accordingly, as they would in any other 
business undertaking, by consciously deciding whether the potential 
benefits justify assumption of the particular risks. As a matter of 
fact, some corporations are so sophisticated that they actually exploit 
the lawyers' Canons of Professional Ethics by purposely sending a 
share of their legal work to every major law firm in town so that 
future adversaries will be hard put to find competent, disinterested 
counsel to represent them against these far-sighted corporations.77 
Corporations that exhibit such "enlightened" self-interest surely 
should be able to protect themselves against the dangers inherent in 
group legal service plans. Thus, trade association legal services seem 
both to provide less important benefits to members and to entail less 
serious danger of harm to the public. 
The crucial question is whether the potential benefits are im-
portant enough to trigger constitutional protection at all. Prior to 
BRT, a common political concern seemed essential, but BRT and 
UMW suggest that an association motivated solely by economic 
concern may also be entitled to constitutional protection. Un-
fortunately, prediction in this area presently remains guesswork; 
future litigation will determine whether and to what extent trade 
associations can fit within the Button, BRT and UMW doctrines. 
Due process balancing tests, though sometimes unavoidable, 78 
invariably are messy and particularly unreliable as planning guides 
for future conduct. This is always unfortunate, but it is tragic where 
it is partially avoidable. As Justice Frankfurter stated in AFL v. 
American Sash Co.79 and in Machinists v. Street: "At the point 
where the mutual advantage of association demands too much indi-
vidual disadvantage, a compromise must be struck .... When that 
point has been reached-where the intersection should fall-is 
plainly a question within the special province of the legislature."80 
77. The author learned of and confirmed this practice in personal interviews with 
several attorneys in large San Francisco and Los Angeles law firms. It also has been 
suggested to the author by a partner in one of the largest firms in the country that 
sophisticated corporate clients are perceptively aware of the inevitability of conflicts 
of interest in the diverse and complex practice of the giant firm. They knowingly 
tradeoff undivided loyalty for the high degree of competence uniquely available at 
such firms. 
78. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 266 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring in result). 
79. 335 U.S. 538, 546 (1949) (concurring opinion). 
80. 367 U.S. 740, 817 (1961) [dissenting opinion, quoting from American Federa-
tion of Labor v, American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 546 (1949)]. 
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The organized bar, the state courts, and the state legislators should 
offer the Supreme Court a feasible option. As long as the traditional 
Canons continue in force, impervious to change regardless of how 
inappropriate they have become, the Court has no choice but to 
plunge headlong into murky waters if it is to fulfill its constitutional 
responsibility. However, if other interested groups, beginning with 
the organized bar, would take an objective look at the public interest 
in a long overdue reformation of the Canons, culling ancient pro-
hibitions until they more precisely reflect rather than frustrate the 
public interest, two advantages would result. In the first place, the 
arena of potential conflict would contract materially, making un-
structured judicial intervention less necessary and less likely. In the 
second, in those cases where judicial intervention proved inescapable, 
the states' view of the public interest would deservedly receive more 
respectful treatment by the Supreme Court, thereby contributing at 
least some degree of precision to the Court's due process balancing 
operation. 
III. PROLOGUE TO THE REFORMULATION OF THE CANONS 
The shock waves of Button, BRT, and UMW will long continue 
to be felt. The organized bar may be excused for its initial stunned 
response, but the time has come to stop complaining about com-
mercialization of the profession and to recognize the opportunity 
these decisions offer. A profession which fails to reassess continually 
its capacity to serve the public is unworthy of the name. Button, 
BRT, and UMW confront us with the necessity and the opportunity 
for fresh thinking-for asking fundamental questions the answers 
t~ which have too long been assumed. 
The advantages available to trade associations only through some 
form of group legal service may not be an important enough con-
stitutional right to outweigh the interest of the state in regulating 
the legal profession through statutes or judicially adopted Canons. 
Indeed, as a threshold determination, these benefits may not rise 
to the dignity of a constitutionally protectible right. Nevertheless, 
merely as a matter of serving the public interest, it seems that the 
Canons should be reformulated to permit enjoyment of these bene-
fits wherever such plans are lawful under state law or whenever they 
should become lawful in states which today proscribe such conduct. 
The danger of trade association members relying to their detriment 
upon erroneous legal advice seems miniscule if the association renders 
such advice only through qualified attorneys and the individual 
members confer with their own counsel before acting upon such 
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advice. The previous discussion also indicates that additional dangers 
to the trade association members certainly are less than those con-
fronting indigent recipients of legal aid, a form of group legal service 
expressly permitted by the Canons. Thus, the public interest in this 
context seems to come down to a nice question of whether the harm 
to society and to the legal profession which might result from the 
acceleration toward concentration of our legal resources in larger 
units outweighs the benefits these group legal services might confer. 
The author would resolve this difficult question in favor of allowing 
trade associations to engage in a wide range of group legal services 
because the postulated harm seems far more speculative than the 
benefits suggested. Utilization of those group legal service plans 
which clearly come under the constitutional protection of Button, 
BRT, and UMW will accelerate the trend toward concentration any-
way; the extent to which the existence of group legal services for 
trade associations will add to this concentration is far from clear. It 
may be preferable to deal with whatever evil inheres in this trend 
by government subsidization of a cadre of solo practitioners rather 
than by denying the public substantial benefits. 
Recommendations for specific changes in the language of the 
Canons are beyond the scope of this Article, which is intended rather 
to provide some perspective for this task and to bring into focus some 
relevant albeit easily-overlooked considerations. Without reviewing 
all that has gone before, several observations merit discussion. There 
seems to be no need to alter the language of canon 47, although the 
notion that associations are guilty of the unauthorized practice of 
law even when they act only through qualified attorney-agents must 
give way where group legal services are protected by the Constitu-
tion under the due process balancing test. At a minimum, Button, 
BRT, and UA:CW should eliminate the possibility of a group-
affiliated attorney being adjudged guilty of violating canon 47 when 
his advice is so limited to matters of common group concern as to 
satisfy the present canon 35. If canon 35 is reformulated to permit 
more extensive group legal services than are now constitutionally 
protected by the Supreme Court, perhaps an addendum to canon 
47 would be in order to make it clear that attorneys who participate 
in such group legal service arrangements do not violate canon 47 
even if the particular state condemns such group services as the 
unauthorized practice of law. In addition, the bar should use its 
influence to persuade such states that their position is unwise and 
unnecessary. 
Reformulation of canon 35 is essential and presents the greatest 
challenge. Conflicts of interest between a member and his associa-
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tion are difficult to eliminate in any legal service program through 
which a group advises its members or litigates on their behalf. Re-
quiring group-affiliated attorneys to disclose the full extent of this 
risk to members whom they undertake to advise or represent may 
palliate but cannot cure this persistent danger. However, the serious-
ness of this danger will vary inversely with the ability of members 
to see the conflicts and to protect themselves. At a minimum, canon 
35 must be modified to accommodate the group legal service plans 
of the NAACP, the BR T, the UlvIW, and other groups who utilize 
similar programs to litigate test cases of political or economic signifi-
cance to their whole membership which otherwise could not be 
brought. 
Alteration of canons 27 and 28 should be narrowly confined so 
that solicitation and the stirring up of litigation is permitted only 
where there is a substantial need to inform the ignorant of their 
rights. Indeed, the present language of canon 28 may be adequate 
if interpretive opinions make clear an appropriately broad construc-
tion of the exception based on "ties of blood, relationship or trust."81 
Deletion of the adjective "rare" preceding this exception will perhaps 
be necessary and sufficient. The future may require greater relaxa-
tion, but restraint would seem wise here until need for additional 
reform is more conclusively established. 
Finally, one other important issue should be discussed. What is 
the potential impact of changes in the Canons upon the attitudes of 
attorneys and upon the incentives which motivate students to enter 
the legal profession? Even if the myth of the independent solo 
practitioner who provides highly personalized and individualized 
service is no longer consonant with the reality of most current urban 
legal practice, it may nevertheless continue to serve a valuable func-
tion. This myth stands as an inspiration to those who would become 
lawyers and as an idealized role model to be approximated as closely 
as possible in big firms and group legal service programs alike. It 
represents a conception of the attorney's role which is imbued with 
dignity, immense personal satisfaction, and an extraordinary degree 
of nondelegable responsibility. The organization may be man's 
greatest achievement in his quest for efficiency, and efficiency may be 
essential in satisfying the needs of the public, but the image of the 
"organization man" does not ignite the imagination or uplift the 
spirit. Button, BR T, and UMW confront the legal profession with 
an agonizing task: the bar must reconcile itself to the need of serving 
the public more efficiently without losing self-respect. 
81. See canon 27 reproduced in text accompanying note 40 supra. 
